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Public reporting burden for the coledion ofl iniormion is estirnsed to average 1 hour per reeponse, inding the tren flo r istructwns searching ex" data sources. gather" and •aiatamig the data needed, and convlesting and resvweng the colec'tron of infomation. Send come•nts regarding this burden estifnte or any other aspedt of this collection of mformalo, incuding suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Servses, iectorate for Information Operaions Application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) offer a number of advantages over traditional multi-component microcircuits including reductions in both size and power dissipation, and are therefore prime candidates to replace such microcircuits in space-borne electronics systems. The results of recent tests of the susceptibilities of various ASIC devices to cosmic ray and trapped proton induced single event upset (SEU) and latchup are reported here and are compared to the susceptibilities of the devices that they would replace. This comparison leads to a discussion of the impact of ASIC devices on the SEU susceptibility of space-borne computers. 
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Abstract
Test Devices
Application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) offer a number Within the last few yeaws we have investigated the SEU and of advantages over traditional multi-component microcircuits latchup susceptibilities of the ASIC device types listed in including reductions in both size and power dissipation, and are Table 1 . These parts are high-speed, low-power devices that therefore prime candidates to replace such microcircuits in have been selected for possible use in space. None of the space-borne electronics systems. The results of recent tests of FPGAs or PLDs were radiation-hardened, whereas all of the the susceptibilities of various ASIC devices to cosmic ray and PPGAs except LL7320Q were. tripped proton induced single event upset (SEU) and latchup The AlteraPLDs werepogranmed in-house prior to testing. are reported here &nd are compared to the susceptibilities of the The memory elements in these devices incorporate CMOS devices that they would replace. This comparison leads to a floating-gate technology and are therefore very similar to some discussion of the impact of ASIC devices on the SEU suscep-EPROMs (Electrically Programmable Read-Only Manory). tibility of space-borne computers.
All of tested FPGA samples were manufactured by Actel in two-level metal (n-well) CMOS (with epitaxial layer) Introduction technology, using Matsushita dies. The Actel ACT1010 (ACT1020) FPGA consists of 295 (546) UTMC CMOS (epi) Test chip 1.5 jtm reported below, followed by a discussion of techniques for RA20K UTMC CMOS (epi) Test chip 1.0 jim reducing the SEU vulnerability of ASIC devices. The suitt A module consists of about 10 PLD -equivalent gates. abiiity of ASIC devices to space applications is then discussed, Actel: Actel Corporation; Altera: Altera Corporation; with an emphasis on the similarities and differences between UTMC: United Technologies Microelectronics Center; these devices and those they would replace in space-borne LSI: LSI Logic Corporation.
computers.
gate array. The Actel ACTI280 is a second generation FPGA The PPGA test devices were programmed either as a series of clocks cycles). This is done to ensure that the circuit memory elements (latches or flip-flops) or as a static random was initialized properly. If an error occurs in this test access memory (SRAM), as shown in Table 2 . The devices cycle, it is flagged as a synchronization error and is not were then tested for SEU susceptibility while the memory counted as an upset The DUT is then reset and the test elements were dynamically operated.
cycle is restarted. (Synchronization errors could result for The FPGAs were programmed as multiple twisted ring the FPGA ring counters from setup times not being met, counters. These counters had a common CLEAR input and because the reset input is asynchronous to the clock.) CLOCK input Each ACT1010 (ACTIO20) was programmed 4. After a successful comparison of the first cycle, the DUT to emulate 4 (5) 10-bit long ring counters (10 master-slave is cycled continually while the outputs are monitored. flip-flops), and therefore contained 40 (50) vulnerable bits.
5. When BASACS finds an error (an output does not match The ACTI280s were programmed as four sets of 60-bit long the prerecorded pattern), the states of all outputs, position twisted ring counters. Each PLD was programmed as a string in the cycle, and other necessary information are uTwh.sof D flip-flops.
mitted to, and stored in the Macintosh computer. The DUT is then reset for 10 ins, and the test starts again SEU and Latchup Measurement after running one test cycle to make sure the device has SEU and laichup tests were conducted at the Lawrence Berkeley completely recovered from the upset Laboratory 88-inch cyclotron facility using Xe (603 MeV), During testing the upset rate was kept between 1 and 3 per Kr (380 MeV), Cu (290 MeV), Ar (180 MeV), Ne (90 MeV), second. This made the dead time caused by resetting the test and N (67 MeV) ion beams. The test devices were oriented at device negligible compared to the total test time. In addition, various angles to the incident beams in order to obtain because the device cycled thousands of times between upsets, "effective LET" values (the effective LET is found by dividing no part of the device was checked more often than any other. the actual LET by the cosine of the exposure angle). Care was After a sufficient number of errors had been stored, the test taken to ensure close agreement among cross-section values was stopped and the total fluence of particles, F, and total obtained from different particle beams having the same number of errors, N, were recorded. The device error probeffective LET. The beam monitor and the mechanism for ability or cross-section, a, was then calculated as: respect to the chip-surface normal. SEU measurements were obtained with a device-independent Latchup was detected by monitoring the device power tester called the Bus Access Storage and Comparison System supply for any abrupt increase in current This was done (BASACS). BASACS is a logic analyzer, operated via a Mac-automatically using a computer-controlled power supply. intosh II computer, that can record the correct output signature SEU measurements were taken at elevated temperatures (for of a test device while the device is not in the beam line ("dry example, 80 0 C and 100 0 C for FPGAs) as well as at room run"). Later, during exposure to a particle beam, BASACS temperature (25°C). The commercial grade devices used iP compares the device outputs with the recorded signature and these tests functioned normally at the elevated temperatures. * Latchup test only. 4-9, respectively. The statistical errors are very small and are t C-modules tested at 250, 800 and 100 0 C. buried in the data points. For LL7320Q and HP03 only one t S-modules tested at 250, 800 and 100*C. device each was tested. As expected, the non-radiation-hardened 0 Test chip; tested at 250, 800 and 100 0 C.
Test Results
LL7320Q had a large SEU cross-section. Among the radiation-LET is measured in MeV/(mg/cm 2 ), and SS, in cm 2 /bit for hardened devices, LRH9320Q had the largest upset cross-SEU and cm 2 /device for latchup. By "No latchup," is meant section -much higher than any of the other PPGAs.
that LETTh is higher than about 100 MeV/(mg/cm 2 ) and the The PLDs were tested mainly for latchup since they are not cross-section is below 10-7 cm 2 /device. radiation-hardened. Only one PLD device type, EP910, was te.:zd for SEU. Unfortunately, the high latchup rate of this device precluded precise determination of the SEU crosssection. Total Dose Considerations In a recent independent total dose test of the Actel FPGAs conducted in our laboratory, both the ACT1010 and ACTI020 1oiu> passed the 500 kRad(Si) level. (For this test the FPGAs were 1o biased during irradiation; both parametric and functional tests ,-wt--e conducted.) The second generation ACT1280 is expected E to have a lower total dose limit. The radiation-hardened LSI
_"
Logic PPGAS have been tested for total dose susceptibility in F 10 LEGEND Other laboratories and have passed the 500 kRad(Si) level [2] . 9 SN The UTMC devices reportedly have a total dose limit of about5 L and W values of about 2 and 50 ijn. respectively, yields a predicted saturation cross-section of 100 pn 2 Aransistor for the A -ACTI010. The SEU saturation cross-section measured for this device was approximately 500 pm2/(flip-flop). or about 125 am 2 ainsistor which is in good agreement with the predicted value. Similar results were obtained for the ACTI020 FPGA.
The physical properties of a C-module in the ACTI280 are quite similar to those in the ACTI010 and ACTIO20. It is not A a surprising. therefore, that the SEU response of an ACTI280 b C-module resembles that of an ACTI010 or ACTIO20 C-module. An ACTI280 S-module consists of circuits similar to those in C-modules and extra storage elements. We attribute the low LET threshold of this device to the storage elements.
(We have not been supplied with detailed circuit diagrams or0 layout information for the ACTI280.) LSI Logic's radiation-hardened LRH9320Q and LRH91000 c -0 PPGAs have different memory cell designs and therefore different sensitive regions. The LRH9320Q incorporates a set of rather simple cross-coupled inverters, as shown in Fig. 11 . This device is susceptible to SEU only when the clock pulse (CP) is logical "low." In this condition the off-state p-and nchannel drains (in the inverters) are sensitive. When CP is " "high" the inverters are driven by the input signal and the latch Fig. 11 . Sensitive Transistors in Simple D Latch is not sensitive to SEU. In contrast, the LRH91000 is con-The cross-coupled inverters combine to store a single bit of structed of master-slave shift registers (D flip-flops), as shown information. Each inverter (top figure) consists of two transistors in Fig. 12 . Each latch consists of cross-coupled NAND gates (middle figure) . The bottom figure shows the cross-coupled (a single NAND gate is shown in Fig. 13 ). For this tievice the inverters while the clock pulse is "low." When the clock pulse two sections (master and slave) are alternately susceptible, becomes "high," the Q output is driven by the input and the latch depending upon the level of the clock pulse: when the clock is essentially SEU immune. pulse is "high" the master section is sensitive and when the clock pulse is "low" the slave section is susceptible. Each
The remaining radiation-hardened LSI Logic PPGA, the cross-coupled NAND gate has a higher capacitance load for the LRHI0038Q, is made up of standard 6-transistor SRAM cells, output transistors, which makes it difficult to upset.
each of which consists of a four transistor flip-flop and two address transistors. In a standard CMOS cell there are two sensitive regions, located at interior nodes [4] .
CLK CLR
The UTMC HP03 PPGA stores infomiation while CP is "high" (see Fig. 14) . When Q is "high" transistors j, I. and m are susceptible, and when Q is "low" transistors i, k, and p are S....susceptible.
0-
t For RA2OK, the master and slave sections are alternately SA 0 susceptible, depending on the level of the clock pulse, as shown in Fig. 15 . The memory cell structure of this device is 0-ta bvery similar to that of the LRH9 1000 (cf. Fig. 12 ).
SEV Reduction and Tolerance
CL
One method for reducing the SEU susceptibility of ASIC --i i _E _ -devices is based on the fact that memory elements can be d Lcreated using many different types of bistable circuits, and the observation that the different types display a range of SEU susceptibilities. For example, the D flip-flop shown in Fig. 12 has a much greater tolerance to SEU than does the D latch Fig. 10 . Actel Module Programmed as Latch shown in Fig. 11 . Once the susceptibilities of various bistable During normal operation. CLR is "low" and T is "high." In this circuit types have been determined, the more SEU tolerant of state the module is susceptible to SEU when CLK is "low"; when them can be chosen for use in critical areas. Of course, device CLK is "high" the module is in the "driven" state and is therefore essentially immune to SEU. The SEU sensitive regions are located designers will need to balance any possible reduction in SEU at the drains of the off-transiitors in the two inverters (a and b) and sWeptibility against other factors, such as complexity, power the off-u'isistors at c and d. and speed considerations. become sensitive only when CP is "low."
Because of the high density of programmable modules in and power consumption of the ASIC devices, but also extend gate arrays, simple error detecting and correcting (EDAC) to considerations of the system's tolerance to SEU. Our results circuits can easily be incorporated into FPGA and PPGA indicate that in many cases a significant reduction in SEU designs. For example, triplets of flip-flops can be program-susceptibility can be achieved by replacing multiple AC or HC med to perform redundant operations in parallel, with an CMOS devices with a single gate array (FPGA or PPGA). additional circuit to calculate the "majority vote" of their SEU tolerance can be further increased through intelligen outputs. An erroneous output resulting from the upset of any design methods such as ii.orporating redundancy into critical single flip-flop can thereby be effectively corrected (actually. circuits. The large number of modules in ASIC devices and ignored). in other words, designers can easily integrate on-chip the ease with which they may be programmed make designing SEU protection (fault-tolerance) into memory circuit designs.
such fault-tolerant systems relatively simple. In a secondary test, majority vote programming of Actei FPGAs produced a dramatic (approximately two orders of magnitude) decrease in the efficacy of SEU to cause output errors. [5, 6] . case, the SEU tolerance of the gate arrays is at least as great as that of HC and AC CMOS devices, and in the case of PPGAs the SEU tolerance is much greater. Thus it appears that electronics systems based on gate arrays will, in general, provide
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The Aerospace Corporation functions as an "architect-engineer" for national security programs, specializing in advanced military space systems. The Corporation's Technology Operations supports the effective and timely development and operation of national security systems through scientific research and the application of advanced technology. Vital to the success of the Corporation is the technical staffs wide-ranging expertise and its ability to stay abreast of new technological developments and program support issues associated with rapidly evolving space systems. Contributing capabilities are provided by these individual Technology Centers:
Electronics Technology Center: Microelectronics, solid-state device physics, VLSI reliability, compound semiconductors, radiation hardening, data storage technologies, infrared detector devices and testiag; electro-optics, quantum electronics, solid-state lasers, optical propagation and communications; cw and pulsed chemical laser development, optical resonators, beam control, atmospheric propagation, and laser effects and countermeasures; atomic frequency standards, applied laser spectroscopy, laser chemistry, laser optoelectronics, phase conjugation and coherent imaging, solar cell physics, battery electrochemistry, battery testing and evaluation.
Mechanics and Materials Technology Center: Evaluation and characterization of new materials: metals, alloys, ceramics, polymers and their composites, and new forms of carbon; development and analysis of thin films and deposition techniques; nondestructive evaluation, component failure analysis and reliability; fracture mechanics and stress corrosion; development and evaluation of hardened components; analysis and evaluation of materials at cryogenic and elevated temperatures; launch vehicle and reentry fluid mechanics, heat transfer and flight dynamics; chemical and electric propulsion; spacecraft structural mechanics, spacecraft survivability and vulnerability assessment; contamination, thermal and structural control; high temperature thermomechanics, gas kinetics and radiation; lubrication and surface phenomena.
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